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Abstract
We develop a ﬁve-region version (Canada, an oil exporter, the United States, emerging Asia and
Japan plus the euro area) of the Global Economy Model (GEM) encompassing production and
trade of crude oil, and use it to study the international transmission mechanism of shocks that
drive oil prices. In the presence of real adjustment costs that reduce the short- and medium-term
responses of oil supply and demand, our simulations can account for large endogenous variations
of oil prices with large effects on the terms of trade of oil-exporting versus oil-importing countries
(in particular, emerging Asia), and result in signiﬁcant wealth transfers between regions. This is
especially true when we consider a sustained increase in productivity growth or a shift in
production technology towards more capital- (and hence oil-) intensive goods in regions such as
emerging Asia. In addition, we study the implications of higher taxes on gasoline that are used to
reduce taxes on labor income, showing that such a policy could increase world productive
capacity while being consistent with a reduction in oil consumption.
JEL classiﬁcation: E66, F32, F47
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Inﬂation and prices; International topics
Résumé
Les auteurs élaborent une version de GEM (Global Economy Model) qui inclut cinq régions (le
Canada, les autres pays exportateurs de pétrole, les États-Unis, les économies émergentes d’Asie,
et le Japon plus la zone euro) et au sein duquel ils modélisent la production et les échanges de
pétrole brut. Ils utilisent ce modèle pour analyser les mécanismes de transmission internationaux
des chocs se répercutant sur le prix du pétrole. En présence de rigidités réelles qui contribuent à
réduire, à court et moyen terme, la réaction de l’offre et de la demande de pétrole, les simulations
présentées dans l’étude montrent que le modèle peut générer de façon endogène de larges
variations du prix du pétrole ayant des effets importants sur les termes de l’échange des régions
exportatrices de pétrole par rapport aux régions importatrices (dont les économies émergentes
d’Asie). Ces fortes variations des termes de l’échange génèrent des transferts de richesse
appréciables entre les régions. Les auteurs observent ce résultat en particulier lorsqu’ils simulent
une augmentation durable du rythme de croissance de la productivité ou une hausse de l’intensité
capitalistique (et donc pétrolière) du processus de production dans des régions comme celle
regroupant les économies émergentes d’Asie. Les auteurs étudient aussi les implications d’uneiv
majoration de la taxe sur l’essence qui permet de réduire les impôts sur le revenu du travail. Ils
démontrent qu’une telle mesure peut entraîner un accroissement des capacités de production dans
le monde tout en favorisant une baisse de la consommation de pétrole.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E66, F32, F47
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Inﬂation et prix; Questions internationales1. Introduction
Over the last few years, the persistent surge in oil prices in both the spot and futures markets
has represented perhaps the most striking challenge to the forecasting abilities of private and
public institutions worldwide. Even as the average monthly spot price of oil increased from
US$19 per barrel at end-2001 to US$43 at end-2004, market participants expected prices to
decline over time to "more reasonable levels". However, since 2005, there have been striking
upward revisions of near- and longer-term price expectations from the futures markets, and
the oil spot price in 2006 occasionally rose above US$70 per barrel, and has stayed persistently
above US$50 per barrel.
The course of events has led to policy-making institutions to ask: what has been the cause
in the run-up in oil prices since 2003, and is the run-up fundamentally di⁄erent from that
experienced during the two oil price shocks in the 1970s? Candidate explanations come from
both demand and supply trends. On the demand side, robust global growth supported by the
rapid (and continual) economic expansion in emerging Asia has been cited as a fundamental
break with the past, particularly in China and India,where the actual rate at which these
economies are expanding seems to have surprised market participants. Overall, there have
been signi￿cant upward revisions in global growth prospects and, in fact, global growth is
expected to exceed four percent for the fourth year in a row (IMF (2006)).
On the supply side, market participants have also revised their views about how quickly
supply will respond to higher prices, given low levels of investment and the fact that the
big oil companies are ￿nding it more di¢ cult to replenish their reserves. Indeed, as it takes
on average eleven years before an oil discovery is commercially operational, it has not been
surprising to some analysts that oil prices have soared when OPEC spare capacity has fallen
to very low levels. The more controversial concern of the ￿peak oil theory￿ ￿ the concept
that the world has reached the natural limits of oil exploitation ￿ is nowadays given more
consideration than in the past.
This paper provides a preliminary assessment of these issues ￿ and their relevance for the
world macroeconomy ￿ by developing an extended version of the Global Economy Model
(GEM) developed at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that explicitly encompasses
consumption, production and trade in oil. The simulation model allows us to study devel-
opments in the world economy that have signi￿cant e⁄ects on oil prices, the international
transmission mechanism through terms of trade ￿ uctuations, and the related wealth transfers
between oil-importing and oil-exporting regions. We address two key questions. First, what
1are the underlying causes of the oil price run-up since 2003? And given those causes, what
are some potential policy measures that could reduce oil prices with the least amount of
(negative) impact on global welfare?
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents some
basic stylized facts on the state of the oil sector. Section 3 provides a brief summary of the
model while Section 4 discusses its calibration. Section 5 then uses the model to present
some preliminary simulation results that we consider to be likely candidates in explaining
the run-up in oil prices since 2004, that we expect will extend into the foreseeable future.
Speci￿cally, we consider shocks that a⁄ect either the demand or supply for oil and discuss
their implications for growth in di⁄erent regions of the world. Section 6 suggests some
policy responses to help ameliorate the upward climb in oil prices. In particular we study the
implications of higher taxes on gasoline that are used to reduce taxes on labor income, showing
that such a policy could increase world productive capacity while reducing oil consumption.
Last, the ￿nal section o⁄ers some concluding remarks about possible future extensions.
2. Oil and the world economy: some stylized facts
This section reviews recent developments in the oil market and the world economy as back-
ground to the shocks we will use in GEM to explain those developments.
2.1 Oil prices
There has been a persistent upward trend in oil prices over the last few years. Figure 1
depicts the evolution of the IMF￿ s World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections and the
actual average petroleum spot price (APSP).1
Focusing ￿rst on the Winter 2003 vintage in the top panel, we observe a short-term hump,
owing to the events unfolding in Iraq. Afterward, oil prices were projected to converge to a
much lower level, hovering around $20 per barrel. There seemed to be an expectation that
supply would accommodate market needs once the short-term disruptions were resolved.
According to the projections made in Winter 2004, a milder uptick in price expectations was
accompanied by an upward revision in longer-term prices by about twenty percent relative to
the previous projection, as shown in the bottom panel. Next, in 2005 there was both a large
1The APSP is the simple arithmetic average of the U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate
spot oil prices. The projection of oil prices is based on oil price future contracts traded on the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).
2near- and longer-term revision to oil prices, owing to signi￿cant changes in the oil market.2
Notice in particular that the long end of the projected oil price curve increased by nearly
100 percent, likely caused by a disappointing supply response. Most recently, compared to
the Winter 2003 projections, the longer-term oil price has been revised upwards by about
200 percent. In contrast with the three other curves, the Winter 2006 projections are almost
constant going forward, primarily because of heightened concerns over the supply of oil.
2.2 Oil supply and demand
Several mutually reinforcing developments have resulted in low levels of oil supply. The most
prominent of these is that OPEC spare capacity (including Iraq) has bottomed out. This
fact is highlighted in Figure 2, which shows quarterly ￿gures for OPEC spare capacity as a
percent of total supply, and the APSP. Notice the divergence between oil prices and spare
capacity, which as of June 2006 is estimated at around 1.3 to 1.8 million barrels per day (EIA
(2006)). At the same time, lagging investment in infrastructure and re￿nery construction, as
well as the aforementioned fact that it takes on average eleven years before an oil discovery is
ready for production, have further compounded supply-side rigidities. Markets have also been
keen to note that big oil companies are ￿nding it more di¢ cult to replenish their reserves.
Along with heightened geopolitical risks, oil supply has become markedly binding, making it
excessively vulnerable to even minor disruptions.
Probably the most important driver of world demand for oil is rapid ￿ and underes-
timated ￿ growth in emerging Asia. Table 1 underscores this point. It reports both the
current year forecasts and actual real GDP growth rates from 2003 to 2005 for China and
India. For both countries, growth forecasts have been consistently lower than the realized
rates. Moreover, solid growth in the United States and the recovery in Japan have led to
signi￿cant upward revisions in global growth prospects. This is clearly conveyed in Figure
3, which shows the projections for world real GDP growth from the IMF￿ s World Economic
Outlook in the top panel and the revisions relative to the Winter 2003 forecasts in the bottom
one. In turn, Figure 4 emphasizes this point by focusing on the cumulative growth rates:
the compounded e⁄ects of seemingly minor revisions can be quite large. To drive home this
2Technical factors did partially account for this phenomenon in 2005. For instance, the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suspended its price band mechanism which served to maintain
expectations of a future downward correction in prices. The price band mechanism was set up by OPEC at its
March 2000 meeting. When the OPEC oil-price basket was above US$28 per barrel for 20 consecutive trading
days or below US$22 per barrel for 10 consecutive trading days, there would be production adjustments.
However, during its January 2005 meeting, OPEC decided that market developments had rendered the band
unrealistic, and temporarily suspended the mechanism.
3point, we also show the cumulative growth rates for the emerging Asian countries in Figure
5.
Taking a more historical perspective, we note that there has been a gradual downward
trend in oil intensity. As measured in kilograms of oil per unit of PPP-adjusted GDP, Figure 6
shows declining oil intensities for selected countries and regions. Although after the 1970s the
decline accelerated, the overall decrease in oil intensity has been protracted. As shown in both
panels, advanced countries tend to have higher oil intensities. With populations exceeding
one billion each and sustained growth rates well over ￿ve percent per year (usually near 10
percent for China), manufacturers and consumers in China and India have been importing
energy at ever-increasing rates. One key source of uncertainty is how this increasing shift
toward higher oil intensity goods and inputs in emerging markets, combined with a high
growth rate in a populous region, will a⁄ect future and ￿ through forward-looking behavior
￿ current oil market developments.
3. The theoretical framework of the model
This section provides a synthetic overview of our simulation model. The world economy con-
sists of ￿ve country blocs (￿ regions￿ ), divided in two groups. The oil-exporting regions consists
of Canada and the group of oil-exporting countries (GOEC) which includes OPEC, Mexico,
Norway, and Russia.3 The oil-importing group consists of the United States, emerging Asia4,
and the bloc of remaining countries which includes Japan and the European Union. In each
region, there are households, ￿rms, and a government. The overall structure of the model is
illustrated in Figure 7, and each sector is described in turn below.5
Each household consumes a non-tradable ￿nal good (C in Figure 7), and is the monopo-
listic supplier of a di⁄erentiated labor input (L) to all domestic ￿rms. Some households have
low monopoly power, are liquidity-constrained, and do not have access to capital markets.
They ￿nance their consumption exclusively through disposable labor incomes. The remain-
ing households own domestic ￿rms and the domestic capital stock (K), which they rent to
domestic ￿rms. They also own two short-term nominal bonds, one denominated in domestic
3This version of the model was built to originally include both energy and non-energy commodities.
Therefore GOEC also includes other major commodity exporters such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South
Africa, Australia and New Zealand.
4Indonesia is excluded and is part of the group of oil exporting countries.
5For an algebraic exposition of the model (excluding the treatment of the gasoline and oil sectors) we
reader is referred to the Appendices of Faruqee, Laxton, Muir and Pesenti (2006a,b). A simpli￿ed variant
encompassing both downstream and upstream intermediate goods is presented in Laxton and Pesenti (2003).
4currency and issued by the region￿ s government, and another denominated in U.S. currency
and issued in zero net supply worldwide. There are intermediation costs for national house-
holds transacting in the international bond market. Labor and physical capital are immobile
internationally. The market for capital is competitive, and capital accumulation is subject
to adjustment costs. In the labor market wage contracts are subject to nominal rigidities.
On the production side, there are three layers of production: ￿nal goods, downstream
intermediate goods (such as semi-￿nished products), and upstream intermediate goods (such
as re￿ned oil products in our setting, and more generally commodities and raw materials).
Perfectly competitive ￿rms produce two ￿nal goods ￿ a consumption good (A) and an
investment good (E). The ￿nal goods are not traded internationally. Both the demand
for the consumption good and the investment good is split between private agents (C and
I respectively) and the public sector (GC and GI respectively). The two ￿nal goods are
produced by using downstream intermediate goods as inputs.
There are three downstream intermediate goods: re￿ned petroleum products such as
gasoline for transportation and fuel used for heating (￿ gasoline￿for short, or GAS), other non-
traded goods and services (N), and internationally traded goods (T). Domestic tradables
used by domestic ￿rms are denoted Q, imports from all other country blocs are denoted M.
To model realistic dynamics of trade volumes, we assume that imports are subject to short-
term adjustment costs that temporarily lower the response of import demand to changes in
relative prices. Intermediate goods are di⁄erentiated, with each variety produced by a single
￿rm under conditions of monopolistic competition worldwide. The prices of intermediate
goods are subject to adjustment costs (nominal price rigidities). Gasoline, nontraded and
traded intermediate goods are all produced with domestic labor inputs, domestic capital and
oil. Oil can be imported (MO) or produced domestically (QO); in both cases the use of oil
in production is subject to short-term adjustment costs.
In our model, re￿ned oil (￿ oil￿for short) is the only tradable upstream intermediate good
(TO). It is produced with capital, labor, and natural resources (LAND). As with other
intermediate goods, oil producers have market power that can change over time. Di⁄erent
from intermediate goods prices or labor wages, oil prices are not subject to nominal rigidities.
However, there are real adjustment costs in the supply of oil that result in very limited short-
term responses of oil production to changes in demand. As a caveat, the fact that oil is
assumed not to be a storable commodity whose price is linked to the rate of return on other
assets implies that its price is determined entirely on its use value. Since the model does not
5include oil inventories, oil prices may respond too strongly to temporary shocks. With this
in mind, it should be emphasized that the model is not meant to explain short-run variations
in oil prices due to market disruption: rather, it has been designed to explain the interaction
of oil prices and the world economy over the medium term.
Finally, the government purchases the two ￿nal goods as well as nontradable services
GN. As treasury, the government ￿nances the excess of its expenditures over net taxes
by borrowing from the domestic private sector. In the long run the government targets a
given ratio of public debt to income, adjusting the tax rate on labor incomes as appropriate.
As central bank, the government manages the national short-term nominal interest rate.
Monetary policy is speci￿ed in terms of a credible commitment to an interest rate rule that
targets in￿ ation.6
4. Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the GEM, with particular attention to the oil and
gasoline sectors. In this paper the calibration builds upon work already presented in Faruqee,
Laxton, Muir and Pesenti (FLMP, 2007a,b). However, there are some notable di⁄erences in
terms of the composition of regions and the addition of the oil and gasoline sectors. The
notation adopted in this section and in Tables 2 through 10 is usually self-explanatory: for
a fuller presentation the reader is referred to the Appendices of FLMP (2007 a,b).
Table 2 includes the parameters relevant for the consumers￿and ￿rms￿optimization prob-
lems. As mentioned above, in each region there are two types of consumers ￿ liquidity-
constrained, low-monopoly power households and forward-looking, high-monopoly power
households. Their shares di⁄er across regions, with liquidity-constrained consumers being
as low as 15 percent of households in the United States, to 50 percent in emerging Asia.
Both types of consumers have similar preferences, with a high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (1=￿) of 5, coupled with a high level of habit persistence in consumption (bc)
of 0.92. This parameterization yields very sluggish consumption behavior in the short-run,
with a hump-shaped response that is ￿ exible in the long run. Conversely, for labor we have
a low Frisch elasticity of labour supply (1=￿) of 0.2 coupled with habit persistence in leisure
(bL) of 0.75.
Table 3 contains the calibration of the production side of the model. The tradable and
6Another version of the interest rate rule can limit the ￿ exibility of the nominal exchange rate against the
U.S. dollar, which will be used in future simulation exercises for the emerging Asia bloc.
6nontradable sectors are calibrated in much the same manner as FLMP (2007a), although the
substitutability among factors is more inelastic, in line with recent work on Canada (Perrier
(2005)) and the United States (Gosselin and Lalonde (2005)). The elasticity of substitution
among factors used in oil production (￿O) is 0.6, but it is 0.7 in gasoline production (￿GAS).
The higher degree of inelasticity in oil production re￿ ects some of the long-term costs in
switching production technology, whereas the higher degree in gasoline production re￿ ects
the fact that there are several methods of varying e¢ ciency (and hence capital and labour
intensity) to obtain gasoline from oil. In sum, while the long-run elasticities in the oil-related
sectors are low, they may not be su¢ cient to provide realistic price responses in the short
run. The latter require strong short-run real adjustment costs to signi￿cantly lower short-
term elasticities toward near-Leontief levels, as will be described below.
The regions are di⁄erentiated from one another by their economic size, the composition
of their domestic economies, and their trade patterns (see Tables 5 and 6). These data are
mostly derived from the National Income and Production Accounts of the countries of each
region, and then mapped into the corresponding bias parameters in the production functions
for tradables, nontradables, oil and gasoline (Table 3) and the demand functions for ￿nal
goods (consumption and investment) and intermediate goods (domestically produced and
imported tradables, nontradables, gasoline and oil, Tables 4 and 3). The role played by
di⁄erences in technology is immediately evident when we take into account factor incomes in
the oil sector (Table 6). Some oil-exporting countries (GOEC) have the least capital-intensive
technology, but other oil-exporting countries (Canada in our setup) have a relatively capital-
intensive technology, meant to capture realistic features of the oil extraction process in the
country (i.e. the Athabasca tar sands or the o⁄shore oil-rigs of Hibernia).
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate our calibration of the world trade ￿ ows for all goods and for oil,
respectively.7 The aggregate import to GDP ratios re￿ ect the levels of imports in 2003 in the
￿ve regions, whereas the aggregate export to GDP ratios are those necessary to support the
net foreign asset to GDP ratios we have chosen (Table 5). The decomposition of aggregate
trade ￿ ows into bilateral trade ￿ ows is also based on 2003 trading patterns found in the
IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics and UN￿ s COMTRADE database of commodity-based
trade ￿ ows.
For aggregate trade, exports plus imports to GDP are 74.1 percent in Canada, 48.0
percent in GOEC, 27.9 percent in the United States, 52.6 percent in emerging Asia and
only 17.8 percent in the remaining countries. The higher trade is as a percent of GDP, the
7The bias parameters associated with the import demand CES aggregators can be found in Table 7.
7more likely an economy will be a⁄ected strongly by foreign shocks. Canada is very open,
as is emerging Asia, while the United States, the European Union and Japan (part of the
remaining countries￿bloc) are much more insulated from foreign disturbances. However, this
is not necessarily the case in the oil market. Here, not only does the degree of openness
matter, but the direction of trade as well. The net exporters are Canada at 3.7 percent of
GDP and GOEC at 8.1 percent of GDP, while the other regions are net importers at 1.4
percent of GDP for the United States, 1.9 percent of GDP for emerging Asia and 0.4 percent
of GDP for remaining countries. Additionally, the group of oil-exporting countries has the
largest amount of its GDP coming from oil production (12.0 percent).
For tradable goods across all regions, imported goods are fairly substitutable with their
domestically produced counterparts (￿A and ￿E = 2.5). Imports of tradable goods can orig-
inate from di⁄erent export countries, and the elasticities of substitution between alternative
exporters (￿A and ￿E) are equal to 1.5. By contrast, there is a very low elasticity of substi-
tution between tradable and nontradable goods in all regions (￿A and ￿E = 0.5), and a very
high elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported oil (￿OT, ￿ON and ￿OGAS
=10). For imported oil, there is less preference as to the region of origin (￿O = 3.0).
As in all previous work on the GEM, the calibration of markups follows Martins et al.
(1996) for prices in the monopolistically competitive tradable and nontradable sectors , and
Jean and Nicoletti (2002) for wages (see Table 8). However, we have assumed almost no
markup in the oil sector for any region, with the exception of the group of exporting countries,
which has a markup of 476 percent. It is estimated that the cost of oil production for OPEC
countries is somewhere around $2 to $5 per barrel, while for a country like Canada it is closer
to $25. So, for any given oil price in the world market that we are considering in the paper,
the group of the oil-exporting countries has the largest markup to sustain the price of oil
and guarantee production in the other regions where production cost are much higher. For
gasoline, the markup is 16 percent in Canada and Japan and the European Union (i.e. the
remaining countries) and 17 percent everywhere else. This excludes government taxes on
gasoline, which we set for illustrative purposes at 30 percent in Canada and the remaining
countries bloc and 15 percent elsewhere (including the United States).
The dynamics of the model are further a⁄ected by nominal rigidities and real adjust-
ment costs, as found in Table 9. Nominal rigidities in prices and real adjustment costs in
investment and trade are calibrated to match moments of other models such as ToTEM
for Canada (Murchison and Rennison (2006)), MUSE for the United States (Gosselin and
Lalonde (2005)), previous work on the GEM for the United States (Julliard et al. (2006)),
8and the new Area-Wide Model (Coenen et al. (2005)) and Smets and Wouters (2005) for the
European Union.
The most important real adjustment costs for this paper are those associated with the
energy sectors. On the supply side, there are adjustment costs associated with changes in
capital (￿KO and ￿KGAS) and labor (￿LO and ￿LGAS) in the production of oil and gasoline.
On the demand side, there are adjustment costs associated with changes in the use of oil in
the production of intermediate tradables, nontradables and gasoline (￿OT, ￿ON and ￿OGAS
respectively), and in the use of gasoline as a component of the ￿nal consumption bundle
(￿GAS). These real adjustment costs are modeled as quadratic adjustment costs following
the Rotemberg (1982) formulation. The parameters associated with the adjustment costs are
set at 300, a value high enough to to generate considerably muted short-term price responses
of supply and demand for gasoline and oil to changes in fundamentals.8 This implies that,
for any shock a⁄ecting the demand or supply of oil, oil prices respond rapidly but volumes
remain relatively unchanged for around 5 to 10 years.
The last key element in the dynamics of the model is the conduct of monetary policy,
found in Table 10. For simplicity, all regions are assumed to be in￿ ation targeters that follow
an in￿ ation-forecast-based (IFB) rule.9 In order to hit a target of 2 percent (2.5 percent in
the United States) for core consumer price in￿ ation four to six quarters in the future, the
change in the interest rate must be twice as large as the deviation of core in￿ ation from its
target level.10
5. Why oil prices have increased: some illustrative ex-
periments
This section starts by presenting some simulation results showing the importance of ad-
justment costs that limit the short-run responses of demand and supply for crude oil, and
their implications for the response of oil prices to productivity shocks. We show that in the
presence of these adjustment costs an upward shift in productivity growth can result in the
combination of high oil prices and robust global growth Next, we investigate the implications
8However, Canada is assumed to have stronger real rigidities in oil production (because of the di¢ culty of
exploiting the Athabasca tar sands) while the group of oil exporting countries is assumed to have weaker real
rigidities (because of the ease with which the abundant near-surface oil in the Middle East can be extracted).
9In future versions of this work emerging Asia will be alternatively assumed to pursue a ￿xed exchange
rate target vis-￿-vis the United States.
10Core in￿ ation in this model excludes the e⁄ect of gasoline prices on the consumption price de￿ ator (a
proxy for the CPI excluding food and energy or some similar measure).
9of higher oil reserves in the future. As an extension of the productivity shock, we illustrate
how the model can be used to assess major risks to the future demand for crude oil that
are the result of uncertainty about future levels of oil intensity and real incomes in emerging
Asia. Finally, we analyze the e⁄ects of a pure supply-induced shock that increases oil prices
through raising the market power of oil producers. Taken in combination, these four experi-
ments can provide the explanation for the increase in oil prices over the past several years.11
In particular, productivity shocks and the types of oil usage that have been seen in emerging
Asia have been key drivers.
5.1 Higher productivity growth in oil-importing regions
To investigate the e⁄ects of rising global demand for oil we consider a positive shock in the
oil-importing regions (the United States, emerging Asia, the remaining countries bloc) that
raises productivity growth in both the tradables and nontradables sectors by one percentage
point for 20 years. However, before presenting the short- and medium-term implications of
higher productivity growth on oil prices and the world economy, we develop a benchmark
scenario where all adjustment costs that limit the short-run and medium-term responses of
the demand and supply of oil to changes in the price of oil are turned o⁄. The comparison
of our simulation results with the benchmark scenario is meant to emphasize two elements:
on the supply side, we introduce signi￿cant real adjustment costs in the attempt to capture
the e⁄ects of severe capacity constraints in the energy sector, as well as the multi-year
delay between oil discoveries and their commercial availability. On the demand side, these
adjustment costs capture the fact that it takes years to change the fuel e¢ ciency of the stock
of motor vehicles or to replace the stock of technology that is used for heating and cooling.
These real adjustment costs imply that both the demand and supply for crude oil will be
extremely inelastic in the short run, requiring large movements in crude oil prices to clear
the energy market.
5.1.1 Responses without real adjustment costs in the energy sector
Figures 10 to 12 report results where all the real adjustment costs that a⁄ect the short-run
demand and supply for oil and gasoline are excluded. The oil-importing regions obviously
bene￿t from higher levels of productivity in their own region, but the increase in oil prices
11It is understood that the current level of oil prices is not totally explicable in the context of these three
shocks, as some of the volatility in the price of oil has nothing to do with the fundamentals of the market.
Rather, they are linked to the perceived political risks attached to the various players (such as the Middle
East or sub-Saharan African countries). Quanti￿cation of such uncertainty, by de￿nition, has no role in a
structural model such as the GEM.
10over time also results in a favorable terms-of-trade shock for regions that are net exporters of
oil (Canada and the group of oil-exporting countries (GOEC)) and a negative terms of trade
shock for the regions that are net importers of oil. To interpret these results it is important
to recall that, in the baseline, net exports of oil in Canada and the group of oil-exporting
countries are equal to 3.6 and 8.1 percent of GDP, while emerging Asia, the United States and
the remaining countries bloc are assumed to be net importers of oil, with oil trade balances
equal to ￿ 1.9, -1.4, -0.4 percent of GDP, respectively.
The price of oil trends upward in tandem with the increase in the demand for oil, re￿ ecting
the assumption of diminishing returns in the production of oil because of a ￿xed factor (land).
For example, for the group of oil-exporting countries, Figure 12 shows that oil prices barely
move in the short run, but then rise gradually over time reaching a level that is about 15
percent higher after 15 years. Oil production increases by only 1.5 percent in the group of oil-
producing countries. It is important to emphasize that in this simulation we are assuming that
there are no new discoveries of oil and that production can only be increased by adding more
capital and labor based on existing reserves. It is worth emphasizing that this experiment is
based on purely arti￿cial assumptions to be relaxed later.
The gradual rise in oil prices results in an improvement in the oil trade balance for
Canada and the GOEC and a deterioration in the regions that import oil. The rise in the
price of oil results in an upward trend in the relative price of gasoline. While monetary
policy is successful at keeping core in￿ ation close to the assumed target, headline in￿ ation is
systematically higher than in the baseline.
The dynamics for consumption, investment and GDP are relatively straightforward. In
those regions that experience higher productivity growth, investment trends upwards until
the capital stock in these economies adjusts to its new higher level. In the medium term,
high investment rates in these regions crowd out investment in the oil-exporting countries as
their rates of return on non-oil investment projects are signi￿cantly lower. However, these
e⁄ects are eventually o⁄set by higher rates of return in the oil sectors in these economies
and aggregate investment rises above baseline. Consumption rises by more than GDP in
the oil-exporting regions and by less than GDP in the oil-importing regions, which simply
re￿ ects the terms-of-trade improvement that the latter experiences.
There are two major forces that require the real e⁄ective exchange rates for the oil-
importing regions to depreciate in the long run. The ￿rst is a result of the improvement in
the terms of trade in the oil-exporting regions and the second re￿ ects the assumption that
11higher growth in the oil-importing regions stems from higher levels of productivity in both
the tradables and nontradables sector. In this case, equal-sized productivity shocks in both
the nontradables and tradables sectors lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate in the
long run, while the standard Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect ￿ which predicts a real exchange rate
appreciation in the long run ￿ relies on productivity growth in the tradables sector exceeding
that of the nontradables sector.
Perhaps surprisingly, for the United States the real exchange rate appreciates in the short
run. This re￿ ects the fact that this region must absorb most of the depreciation in emerging
Asia and the remaining countries bloc, both blocs being characterized by strong trade linkages
with the United States. The appreciation also explains the short-run fall in U.S. net foreign
liabilities measured as a ratio of nominal GDP, even as the trade balance worsens. In the
very long run the desired stock of U.S. net foreign liabilities is actually higher than in the
baseline, a fact that contributes to generate pressure toward a long-run depreciation. The
latter is needed to generate a trade surplus that ￿nances the higher interest burden on the
larger stock of net foreign liabilities.
5.1.2 Responses with real adjustment costs in the energy sector
Figures 13 to 15 report the e⁄ects of the productivity shock, except in this case the real
adjustment costs that limit the short-run oil supply and oil demand responses are fully
operational. Oil prices now jump up on impact, decline over the ￿rst year, before rising
steadily over time. A comparison of Figures 12 and 15 show that oil prices are substantially
higher over the medium term, re￿ ecting the sluggish response of the supply of crude oil. As
can be seen in the ￿gures, higher oil prices greatly magnify the near-term and medium-term
e⁄ects of the terms-of-trade e⁄ects and increase the magnitude of the wealth transfer between
regions that import oil and regions that export oil.
While this has signi￿cant e⁄ects on the short-run dynamics, the basic macro dynamics
presented earlier remain. Although the magnitudes of the real exchange rate responses are
di⁄erent than in the case without real adjustment costs, they follow the same basic pattern.
In spite of the large oil price increase, the stance of monetary policy is adjusted in all regions
to keep core in￿ ation close to the target. This requires an increase in nominal interest rates
that is larger than the increase in headline in￿ ation, as higher productivity growth increases
the marginal product of capital and implicitly shifts up the neutral policy rate.12
12While we do not have a neutral policy rate in the reaction function, the latter is speci￿ed in such a way
that allows the real interest rate to depart from its long-run equilibrium value when there are shocks that
12While we have not performed a detailed accounting of the role of demand shocks behind
the hike in oil prices since 2004, this illustrative scenario shows that it is possible in principle
to account broadly for the combination of high oil prices and robust global growth, once
the role of stronger fundamentals driving underlying productivity growth is appropriately
considered.13
5.2 An expectation of greater availability of oil reserves in the fu-
ture
The previous results are likely to overestimate the e⁄ects of persistent productivity growth
shocks on oil prices in the future because they assume that the available level of reserves is
￿xed. Our modelling strategy in fact treats available oil reserves as an exogenous variable,
without attempting to model new oil discoveries.14 In addition to ￿nding new oil ￿elds, there
are two additional reasons why available reserves could increase in response to higher oil
prices. First, the latter create incentives to develop new technology to increase the production
of crude oil from existing ￿elds. Second, when access to oil ￿elds has been restricted by
governments, they may choose to relax these restrictions either to raise the levels of revenue
or because of concerns about energy security.
Figure 16 reports results where we assume a gradual increase in available reserves in the
oil-exporting regions starting in the sixth year of the simulation. This results in an increase
in oil production after 15 years by about 6 percent in Canada and by about 8 percent in the
group of oil exporters. Re￿ ecting the larger supply, there is a downward shift in oil prices
by about 10 percent from the sixth year onward. This expected improvement in the terms of
trade for oil-importing regions raises consumption, investment and GDP in the short run and
reduces consumption in the oil-exporting regions. In the short run, investment also rises in
the oil-exporting countries, as the oil extraction process in the future is expected to require
additional levels of capital.
The pattern of oil prices clearly shows a potential weakness of the model, which assumes
that oil is not a storable commodity but derives its value only from its use in production
change the marginal product of capital over long periods of time. This, of course, is necessary condition to
keep core in￿ ation close to the target.
13Once the calibration of the model has been ￿nalized, we plan to develop estimates of demand and supply
shocks that can account for high oil prices and the pattern of growth and savings behavior observed over the
last few years ￿ for a similar exercise that ignored the role of oil prices see FLMP (2006a).
14In a future versions we may add an option where available oil reserves will behave as quasi-￿xed factor
that responds with very long lags to changes in oil prices.
13and consumption. Extending the model to allow for oil inventories would obviously smooth
out the decline in oil prices observed after the sixth year. Also, allowing for trade in oil
stocks would create an arbitrage condition that would link changes in oil prices to the rates
of return on other assets. Unfortunately, both of these assumptions would greatly complicate
the structure of the model.
5.3 Increase in the demand for oil in emerging Asia
Long-term projections of the demand for oil depend critically on assumptions about the
future use of motor vehicles in emerging Asia. Given its substantial population as well as the
potential uncertainty associated with the speed at which its real per capita income is likely
to bridge the gap with the OECD countries. Studies that have focused on the implications of
this uncertainty have usually taken energy prices as given and assumed that the supply of oil
will be su¢ cient to smoothly accommodate variations in its demand ￿ see for example IMF
(2005b). Our simulation introduces the endogenous response of energy prices. To consider
the implications of permanent shocks to the future demand for oil in emerging Asia, we ￿rst
consider a scenario in which the increased demand for oil is the result of two factors: a taste
shift that raises consumers￿demand for gasoline, and a technology shift that increases the
amount of oil needed to produce tradables and nontradables. The shock is phased in slowly
over time, and raises the real level of oil consumption by roughly 2.5 percent of GDP by the
￿fteen year of the simulation. We then consider an alternative scenario that combines the
increase of intensity in oil usage with higher productivity growth in emerging Asia.
Figures 17 to 19 report the results. An increase in demand for gasoline in emerging Asia
raises oil prices and shifts the terms of trade in favor of the oil-exporting regions and against
the oil-importing regions. As a result, consumption increases in the regions that are net
exporters of oil and eventually declines in the regions that are net importers.
In terms of quantitative magnitudes, crude oil prices rise by about 10 percent on impact,
decline over the ￿rst year and then trend upwards over time reaching a peak that is around
25 percent higher than baseline. Again, the pro￿le for oil prices re￿ ects very low short-run
elasticities of supply and demand for crude oil, which means that oil prices have to bear all
of the burden of adjustment in the short run. The e⁄ects on oil trade balances are much
larger in the short run for the GOEC and Canada relative to the baseline (equal to 8.1 and
3.6 percent of GDP, respectively). The negative e⁄ects on the oil trade balance in emerging
Asia builds up over time and reaches about 5 percentage points of GDP after about 15 years.
14This analysis assumes that the shock represents a pure shift in tastes toward consump-
tion of transportation services that use gasoline intensively. Obviously, the interaction of
higher growth combined with increased intensity of oil usage could have much more impor-
tant implications for the demand for oil and the world economy. Conventional econometric
estimates of the demand for motor vehicles suggest that these goods are luxury items whose
consumption shares expand with higher levels of wealth and real income. To understand the
importance of this interaction, we consider a scenario where productivity growth is higher
in emerging Asia in both the tradable and nontradables sectors and there is a concomitant
increase in the intensity of oil usage (Figure 20). The e⁄ects of the oil-intensity shock are
ampli￿ed by the increase in productivity, and vice-versa ￿ the results of the two shocks are
closer to being multiplicative, rather than additive. We see the world price of oil increasing
almost 20 percent on impact (twice that of the oil demand shock alone) and 60 percent in
the long run.
5.4 Supply-induced oil price hike
Figures 21 to 23 report the results for a supply shock that raises the price of oil by about
50 percent after 10 quarters and by about one half as much after 15 years. Note that as
the demand for oil is very inelastic in the short run, the downward pro￿le for oil prices is
consistent with a markup over marginal producer costs in the oil sector that rises gradually
over time.
The increase in the terms of trade in favor of the oil-exporting regions leads to an increase
in consumption in the short run. However, to mimic the qualitative behavior of actual current
account surpluses in the recent past, we assume that this change is accompanied by an upward
shift in the desired net foreign asset positions of all oil-exporting regions. This limits the rise
of consumption over the medium term, but allows consumption to be permanently higher in
the long run.
Higher wealth also leads to a fall in labor supply, as it results in an increase in time
devoted to leisure. For the group of oil exporters, since oil is such an important part of
their economy (12 percent of production), real GDP actually falls permanently (by about 2.5
percent) as export volumes drop. This e⁄ect may be o⁄set partially by special circumstances
in the labor market in these economies ￿ for instance ,because their economies depend
heavily on migrant labor.15 Therefore, we assume a shift in the labor supply function that
15This is particularly true of the OPEC countries. For example, in 2003, 79 percent of workers in Saudi
Arabia were non-Saudi nationals.
15allows a slight increase in labor e⁄ort in the group of oil-exporting countries rather than
allowing it to fall over time. The oil-importing regions are clearly worse o⁄, as they face a
negative terms-of-trade shock that increases the cost of producing goods and services, which
over time results in a decline in investment and lower levels of productive capacity.
6. Some potential policy responses
Given the long-run nature (i.e. usually a minimum of 15 years) of the scenarios o⁄ered above,
it is appropriate to provide some normative suggestions as to how policymakers (particularly
the regions￿governments) can help reduce dependence on oil, and reduce the negative impacts
that still-increasing and high oil prices will have on future world output growth We focus
on concrete policy measures, not regulatory measures or legal restrictions on fuel usage in
the automobile sector or industry, since these can be hard to quantify in a model-consistent
fashion. While several policy experiments could be carried out with our model involving
both (or either) ￿rms and individuals, we demonstrate below that the governments can use
a global hike in tax rates on gasoline, in tandem with a reduction in taxes on labor income
to achieve a notable reduction in oil prices and use of oil.
6.1 A global increase in gasoline tax rates
We focus on the e⁄ects of a 25 percentage point increase in gasoline tax rates in all regions
of the world. In each region, it is assumed that the additional tax revenue is used to reduce
distortionary taxes on labor income. As a result, productive capacity increases, with positive
e⁄ects on aggregate employment and investment. The results are reported in Figures 24 to
26.
The tax hike on gasoline eventually results in a substitution away from consumption of
energy, but this is a very long and slow process given the low short-run elasticities of demand
for oil. Oil prices decline by almost ￿ve percent. This decline in prices results in a reduction
in the oil trade balance in the group of oil-producing countries that is about twice the e⁄ect
for Canada, re￿ ecting di⁄erences in their initial oil trade balances. The reduction in labor
tax rates raises the aggregate real wage and results in higher investment and GDP in the oil-
importing countries, but this e⁄ect is also quite signi￿cant in Canada, where the expansion
in employment in the non-oil sector outweighs the decline in employment in the oil sector.
Consumption in the oil-importing (oil-exporting) regions increases (decreases) because
lower oil prices represent a positive terms of trade shock and a wealth transfer from oil-
16exporting regions to oil-importing regions. In Canada, this negative terms of-trade shock
results in decline in consumption in the short run, but over time the expansion in produc-
tive capacity and real income results in higher levels of consumption. Real exchange rates
depreciate in the oil-exporting regions and appreciate in the oil-consuming regions.
The welfare implications, expressed in terms of the consumption equivalent, are fairly
small, as shown in Table 11.16 The steady-state implications of the global gasoline tax
among the regions is at most -0.4 percent of consumption. Not surprising, the biggest loser
is the group of oil exporting countries. Canada loses the consumption equivalent of 0.29
percent in the long run - less than the other oil exporters because of its more diversi￿ed
economy. In contrast, oil importers experience minimal welfare losses (less than 0.1 percent
of consumption) as they do not face the direct wealth e⁄ect that the oil exporters experience
from lower oil revenues. In general, liquidity-constrained consumers bene￿t, as their tax
burden falls signi￿cantly relative to forward-looking consumers, who bear more of the burden
of the gasoline tax (and are owners of the oil wealth which decreases). Welfare declines in all
regions as the majority of consumers are forward-looking.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a ￿ve-region model of the global economy and carried out scenario
analyses to study the implications of di⁄erent shocks driving oil prices worldwide. The model
introduces signi￿cant real adjustment costs in the energy sector, making both the demand
and supply for crude oil extremely inelastic in the short run, thus requiring large movements
in crude oil prices to clear the energy market.
To answer the ￿rst question about the underlying causes of the oil price run-up since 2003,
the model properties o⁄er a story based on stronger productivity growth in oil importing
regions coupled with shifts in oil intensity in production (emerging Asia), and (to a much
lesser extent) pure price increases by oil producers. Oil price shocks stemming from higher
growth in the oil-importing regions are accompanied by wealth transfers through terms-
of-trade movements, leading consumption to grow slower than output in the oil-importing
regions. In the medium term, high investment rates in the high-growth regions crowd out
investment in the oil-exporting regions. These results need not hold if higher oil prices bring
16Welfare is measured in terms of consumption equivalents, de￿ned as the amount of consumption required
to achieve a certain level of utility, holding labour supply (leisure) at its pre-shock steady-state level. There
may be further bene￿ts that are not quanti￿ed, such as any shift to new (less polluting) fuel sources that
could occur (but are not captured) in face of the tax shock. Moreover, this section only considers the long-run
welfare implications, not those occuring on impact of the tax increase.
17about expectations of a larger availability of oil reserves in the future. Moreover, the positive
e⁄ects of higher oil prices on consumption need not translate into reduced current account
surpluses in the oil-exporting regions, to the extent that they are accompanied by an upward
shift in the desired net foreign asset positions. The conclusions about the role of increased
productivity in the oil-importing regions can be reinforced by considering emerging Asia in
particular, with its increased intensive use of oil in the production of tradable goods.
Our second question about whether policy can be used to ameliorate many of negative
impacts of increasing and higher oil prices is answered by exploring the implications of a
global tax hike on gasoline. Such a measure reduces oil prices by almost ￿ve percent, and
results in a positive terms-of-trade shock for the oil-importing regions, as well as a wealth
transfer from oil-exporting regions to oil-importing regions. This leads to an increase in
consumption in the oil-importing regions and decreases everywhere else. Furthermore, the
reduction in labor tax rates raises the aggregate real wage and results in higher investment
and GDP. On net, the world su⁄ers a small welfare loss, but this masks regional variations,
where the e⁄ects are negligible in the oil importing regions, but notable in the oil-exporting
regions.
Going forward, a number of extensions can be suggested. First, it would be useful to
develop a more detailed assessment of the role of demand and supply shocks and their con-
tribution to explaining the rise in oil prices over the last three years. Second, it would be
useful to extend the results of FLMP (2007a) by developing a baseline scenario for the world
economy, which could be used as a reference for studying the implications of alternative
policies.
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20Table 1: Growth Forecasts for China and India from Consensus Economics
2003 2004 2005
China
Forecast 7.4 8.3 8.6
Actual 10.0 10.1 9.9
India
Forecast 5.6 6.8 6.9
Actual 7.2 8.1 8.3
Table 2: Core Parameters of the GEM
Parameter CA OE US AS RC





￿ 100 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Depreciation rate ￿ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=￿ 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Habit persistence in consumption bc 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Frisch elasticity of labor 1=￿ 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Share of liquidity-constrained consumers SLC 0.20 0.25 0.15 0.50 0.25
Habit persistence in labor b‘ 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
CA = CAnada, OE = group of Oil-Exporting countries, US =United States,
AS = emerging ASia and RC = Remaining Countries (incl. Japan and EU)
21Table 3: Parameterization of the Production Functions
Parameter CA OE US AS RC
Tradable Intermediate Goods
Substitution between factors of production ￿T 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Bias towards capital ￿KT 0.71 0.80 0.70 0.75 0.79
Bias towards oil ￿OT 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04
Nontradable Intermediate Goods
Substitution between factors of production ￿N 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Bias towards capital ￿KN 0.68 0.73 0.60 0.68 0.74
Bias towards oil ￿ON 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02
Oil
Substitution between factors of production ￿O 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Bias towards capital ￿KO 0.68 0.14 0.53 0.42 0.59
Bias towards natural resources (LAND) ￿LAND 0.31 0.85 0.46 0.52 0.40
Gasoline
Substitution between factors of production ￿GAS 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Bias towards capital ￿KGAS 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.46
Bias towards oil ￿OGAS 0.54 0.57 0.51 0.52 0.53
Table 4: Parameterization of the Final Demand Functions
Parameter CA OE US AS RC
Final Consumption Goods
Substitution between domestic and imported goods ￿A 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Bias towards domestic goods ￿A 0.28 0.58 0.86 0.02 0.93
Substitution between domestic tradables and nontradables "A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bias towards tradable goods ￿A 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.42 0.65
Substitution between gasoline and the rest "GAS 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Bias towards gasoline ￿GAS 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.16
Final Investment Goods
Substitution between domestic and imported goods ￿E 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Bias towards domestic goods ￿E 0.25 0.33 0.86 0.02 0.92
Substitution between domestic tradables and nontradables "E 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bias towards tradable goods ￿E 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.75
Demand for Oil in Production
Substitution between domestic and imported oil ￿OT, ￿ON, ￿OGAS 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Bias towards domestic oil for producing tradables ￿OT 0.09 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.86
Bias towards domestic oil for producing nontradables ￿ON 0.03 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.60
Bias towards domestic oil for producing gasoline ￿OGAS 0.19 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.98
22Table 5: Steady-State National Accounts - Expenditure Side
Ratio of GDP CA OE US AS RC
Total Consumption A + PNGN 80.0 81.4 81.0 64.4 79.5
Private C 56.5 64.3 65.8 50.1 58.8
Public GC + PNGN 23.5 17.1 15.2 14.3 20.7
Total Investment PEE 19.9 18.8 18.4 36.0 20.8
Private PEI 17.4 16.8 16.4 34.5 18.3
Public PEGI 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.5
Trade balance TBAL 0.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.2
Imports IM 37.0 24.0 13.7 26.5 9.0
Consumption Goods PMAMA 23.2 13.8 8.0 11.2 4.6
Investment Goods PMEME 11.6 8.4 4.0 12.5 3.2
Oil for producing Gasoline POGASMOGAS 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.2
Other Oil POTMOT + PONMON 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.3 1.0
Oil Demand POTOT + PONON + POGASOGAS 3.9 3.9 3.5 5.0 2.7
Gasoline Demand PGAS(1 + ￿GAS)GAS 3.0 2.3 3.3 2.5 3.1
Government Debt B 25.0 24.0 15.0 24.0 67.0
Net Foreign Assets B￿ -7.5 21.4 -50.0 35.0 23.0
Share of World GDP (percent) 2.4 9.3 30.1 10.6 47.6
Table 6: Steady-State National Accounts - Production Side
Ratio of GDP CA OE US AS RC
Tradables 43.9 36.2 48.2 65.1 45.8
Nontradables 49.5 53.4 50.0 34.3 50.0
Gasoline 2.3 2.0 2.9 2.2 2.4
Oil Production 7.5 11.9 3.1 2.3 2.1
Factor Incomes (% share of oil production)
Capital 29.7 12.9 20.7 24.0 26.5
Labor 10.8 8.1 8.3 16.2 9.9
Land 59.5 79.0 71.0 59.8 63.6
Columns will not sum to 100, as gasoline
and oil production overlap as a share of GDP.
23Table 7: Calibrating the International Linkages
Parameter CA OE US AS RC
Substitution between imports from di⁄erent regions ￿A 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Bias towards imported consumption goods bA from
Canada ... 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.03
Group of oil-exporting countries 0.06 ... 0.16 0.12 0.21
United States 0.71 0.45 ... 0.28 0.69
Emerging Asia 0.02 0.04 0.07 ... 0.07
Remaining countries 0.21 0.49 0.55 0.58 ...
Substitution between imports from di⁄erent regions ￿E 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Bias towards imported investment goods bE from
Canada ... 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.02
Group of oil-exporting countries 0.06 ... 0.21 0.04 0.09
United States 0.64 0.59 ... 0.31 0.74
Emerging Asia 0.04 0.06 0.14 ... 0.15
Remaining countries 0.26 0.33 0.51 0.64 ...
Substitution between imports from di⁄erent regions ￿o 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Bias towards imported oil bo from
Canada ... 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.01
Group of oil-exporting countries 0.31 ... 0.45 0.38 0.81
United States 0.41 0.26 ... 0.05 0.16
Emerging Asia 0.00 0.01 0.00 ... 0.01
Remaining countries 0.29 0.73 0.33 0.57 ...
Net Foreign Liabilities
Short-run dynamics ￿B1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Short-run dynamics ￿B2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
percent related to domestic government debt ￿F1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
24Table 8: Price and Wage Markups
Parameter CA OE US AS RC
Tradables
Markup ￿T=(￿T ￿ 1) 1.20 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.20
￿T 6.00 6.56 7.67 8.00 5.89
Nontradables
Markup ￿N=(￿N ￿ 1) 1.42 1.23 1.28 1.25 1.38
￿N 3.38 5.34 4.58 5.00 3.63
Oil
Markup ￿O=(￿O ￿ 1) 1.01 476 1.01 1.01 1.01
￿O 100 1.21 100 100 100
Gasoline
Markup ￿GAS=(￿GAS ￿ 1) 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.16
Markup and Taxes 1.51 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.51
￿GAS 7.15 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.15
Wages
Markup  =(  ￿ 1) 1.20 1.30 1.16 1.16 1.30
  6.00 4.30 7.30 7.30 4.30
Table 9: Real Adjustment Costs and Nominal Rigidities
Parameter CA OE US AS RC
Real Adjustment Costs
Capital accumulation ￿I1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Investment changes ￿I2 100 100 100 100 100
Imports of consumption goods ￿MA 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Imports of investment goods ￿ME 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
In the Oil and Gasoline Sectors
Capital for producing oil ￿KO 375 225 300 300 300
Capital for producing gasoline ￿KGAS 300 300 300 300 300
Labor for producing oil ￿LO 375 225 300 300 300
Labor for producing gasoline ￿LGAS 300 300 300 300 300
Demand for oil in production. ￿OT, ￿ON 300 300 300 300 300
Nominal Rigidities
Weight on past versus steady-state in￿ ation 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Wages for liquidity-constrained consumers ￿WLC 900 800 800 1050 800
Wages for forward-looking consumers ￿WFL 900 800 800 1050 800
Price of domestically-produced tradables ￿PQ 700 700 700 900 700
Price of nontradables ￿PN 700 700 700 900 700
Price of imported intermediate goods ￿PM 4000 4000 4000 4000 4250
25Table 10: Monetary Policy Reaction Function Parameters
Parameter IFB Rule Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Lagged interest rate at t-1 !i 1.00 1.00
Core in￿ ation gap at t+3 !1 2.00 0.00
Change in the nominal exch. rate at t !2 2.00 1000000 (proxy for 1)
Table 11: Welfare Implications of a Global Increase in Gasoline Tax Rates of 25 Percentage
Points (
Welfare (Consumption Equivalent) CA OE US AS RC
All consumers -0.29 -0.40 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09
Forward looking consumers -0.30 -0.42 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10
Liquidity-constrained consumers 1.02 0.66 0.56 1.01 0.70
26Figure 1: Oil Price Revision
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27Figure 2: OPEC-11 Spare Capacity and Oil Prices, 2000 to 2005

















































28Figure 3: World Real GDP Growth Revisions
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29Figure 4: World Cumulative Real GDP Growth Revisions
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30Figure 5: Emerging Asia Cumulative Real GDP Growth Revisions
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31Figure 6: Oil Intensity
Oil Consumption per Unit of Output
(Kilograms per unit of real PPP-adjusted GDP, 1971-2004)































































32Figure 7: Production Structure of the GEM
33Figure 8: International Trade Linkages (all goods; steady-state calibration; percent of world
GDP)
34Figure 9: International Trade Linkages (oil sector; steady-state calibration; percent of world
GDP)
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45Figure 20: Higher Growth and Oil Intensity in Emerging Asia
(Deviation From Control)
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